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STRENGTHENING SECURITY IN MALI
WITH WEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
by Marlène Dupouy [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]

The UNMAS contribution to weapons and ammunition management (WAM) has been innovative and holistic by combining
practical, safe storage solutions and tailor-made, on-site facility management training, complemented by in-depth trainings.
Lessons learned from working in Mali as well as input from other UNMAS WAM programs, including Côte d’Ivoire and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, led to the development of a
technical guide to improve standardization. More recently, the importance of WAM as a preventive measure against stockpile diversion has been further strengthened by Security Council resolution
2370. 2

Implementing Innovative Solutions

Figure 1. Map of Mali.
All graphics courtesy of UNMAS Mali.
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hen insurgent groups in Mali initiated a rebellion for
independence in late 2011, the National Guard and the
Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) in Gao
were at the forefront of hostilities, which included the pillaging of
weapons from government stores. Concurrently, the demise of the
Gaddafi regime in Libya triggered an influx of small arms and light
weapons (SA/LW) across the Sahel region and the return of fighters
from Libya, making northern Mali their base. That challenge was
quickly seized upon by jihadists and opportunists aiming to further
destabilize Mali and enlarge their bases and activities throughout
the Sahel region.
Often referred to as the real weapons of mass destruction, SA/LW
play a critical role in the perpetuation and the spread of armed conflicts. Cheap, durable, and easily concealed, SA/LW remain the primary weapons of inter-community tensions, armed insurrections,
armed rebel activities, or terrorism. The illicit proliferation, accentuated by the porous nature of borders in the region, has had a devastating effect on development, governance, and the everyday life
of communities.
Since 2013, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS),
as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has been mandated
by Security Council resolution 2364 “to assist the Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition management.”1 The
resolution also “calls upon the Malian authorities, with the assistance of MINUSMA ... and international partners, to address the
issue of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and
light weapons.”1

Mali is a vast, landlocked country of more than 1.2 million sq km
(nearly .5 million sq mi). The roads connecting the south and north
are in a poor state of repair and are often targeted by armed terrorist groups in an effort to disrupt supply chains. Furthermore, the
loss of state control in northern regions for years combined with the
latest crisis has exacerbated the poor infrastructure situation.
To respond to the priorities of the MDSF in such a complex operational context, UNMAS had to develop the most flexible, fit-forpurpose, and cost-effective solutions for weapons storage in remote
areas. To reinforce the safety and security of government-owned
SA/LW, UNMAS has proposed standardized solutions for the construction of temporary storage facilities. These armories consist of
a 20 ft (6.1 m) container and offer a range of capacities from 100 to
220 weapons. Most include a separate compartment for small arms
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ammunition storage, with a capacity of approximately 2 metric tons
(2.2 US tons). This ready-made solution can be implemented in one
month with minimal supervision on site, thereby mitigating the risk
of failure by local contractors. Containers are prepared in Bamako
or other main cities before being transported and assembled onsite, thus limiting the risk of exposure of both local contractors and
UNMAS personnel. This temporary and mobile solution allows the
MDSF to move their storage facilities if need be. These turn-key
rehabilitation projects are easily duplicable at a relatively low cost
(USD$10,000 per unit).
To date, 22 such facilities have been constructed or rehabilitated in northern Mali, including remote locations such as Diré,
Niafunké, Goundam, and Ménaka. Additionally, to support the
MDSF while on operational deployment, armory kit solutions were
developed. The kits are composed of a container, metallic basement, mobile roof, ventilations, mobile solar panels, gun racks, unloading bays, etc., and are mobile, easily transportable, and fast to
assemble in the field with minimal skills. They are intended to ease
deployment and provide safer storage for both SA/LW and their
ammunition. They can be installed with minimal technical knowledge, skills, and means.
The team in Mali pioneered a “Technical Booklet for temporary armouries” that serves as a tool for learning and improving
the quality of design and construction of weapons storage facilities across UNMAS field programs. Following this successful initiative, the focus of the team shifted to efforts at standardizing
ammunition storage solutions. These turn-key solutions are easily
applicable by the United Nations, NGOs, or private operators that
constitute the WAM community.
Aiming to ensure sustainability through national ownership,
Malian personnel in charge of newly rehabilitated armories also
benefit from tailor-made WAM induction training. This three-day
training package is delivered on-site and is aimed at supporting the
operationalization of the armory and enhancing the capacity of the
MDSF to operate safely. The training is conducted in parallel to other qualifying WAM training in Bamako. Complementing these safe
storage initiatives, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training,
mentorship, and specialized equipment were provided to support a
national capacity to conduct bulk demolitions.
Contributing to Stabilization Efforts
Improved WAM contributed to stabilization and redeployment
efforts by enabling the MDSF to access safe SA/LW and ammunition stockpiles in areas of operation, as well as by impeding the pillaging of weapons and ammunition stocks and their deployment
during hostilities in Mali. All uniformed services deployed in remote areas—namely the MDSF, the Water and Forestry units, the
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Customs and the Penitentiary Administration—have benefited
from such support. Among them, the National Guard is the most
decentralized service and often targeted by terrorist attacks across
the country. The National Guard plays a critical role in the redeployment of state authority in the most remote areas with direct
contact with local populations. The rehabilitation of weapons and
ammunition storage areas in central and northern Mali, as well as
the provision of trainings, contribute to the return of state authority
in these areas by strengthening the capacity of state institutions—
in this case Malian Defense and Security Forces to securely store
their weaponry. In addition, it helps to foster the conditions that are
necessary for the redeployment of MDSF in central and northern
Mali. UNMAS has supported this security force with the rehabilitation of armories in Gao, Ménaka, and soon-to-be Gossi, as well as
with the delivery of various WAM induction trainings that enable
the National Guard to be operational and to prevent looting of national stockpiles.
When interviewed on 7 August 2017, the commanding officer of
the National Guard in Gao highlighted that UNMAS assistance
helped to support stabilization efforts and that a positive impact
was noticed on the ground. He emphasized that the WAM trainings
contribute to raising awareness of personnel on the importance of
applying best practices in order to avoid stockpile diversion and accidents. Moreover, he stressed the significant impact of implementing rehabilitation projects in rural areas as a positive signal for local
administrations and populations and a significant contribution to
stabilization efforts in Mali.
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Endnotes
Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards by Rhodes, Ph.D. [ from page 4 ]
1. An IED is defined as a ‘device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic
materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military components’ (IMAS 04.10 3.134: 2013 & IATG 01.40:2011). Those victim–operated devices laid as landmines are referred to in this paper as locally manufactured landmines
or improvised landmines .
2. The phrase ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ is redundant as Mine Action by definition is humanitarian. In this paper Mine Action is used where others may use the phrase
Humanitarian Mine Action.
3. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 13.
4. Email correspondence with The Halo Trust. Statistics current to August 2017.
5. Email correspondence with MAG. Statistics current to August 2017.
6. Email correspondence with DAICMA. Statistics current to July 2017.
7. IMAS 01.10 Section 5.
8. IMAS 01.10 Section 6.2.
9. Mine action operators must therefore conduct risk assessments that include proper assessments of the conflict in question and of the actors involved. Such assessments
will examine whether areas being targeted for clearance are permissive environments, where explosive devices are no longer in use for the parties to the conflict, or
whether conflict is ‘active’ in a given area and therefore not appropriate for mine action operations.
10. http://www.mineaction.org/improvised-explosive-device-lexicon.
11. Understanding the Regional and Transnational Networks that Facilitate IED Use, AOAV, 2017.
12. For instance IMAS 09.11 concerns Battle Area Clearance ‘including UXO, AXO, booby traps and failed, or abandoned, IEDs left behind after hostilities have ceased.’
13. IMAS 04.10 and IATG definition: EO - all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs
and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and
dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and all similar or related items
or components explosive in nature.
14. IMAS 04.10 anti-personnel landmine definition - ‘a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure
or kill one or more persons’. The definition of an anti-personnel mine by virtue of its emphasis on the impact of the munition, as opposed to its construction, includes
mines that have been constructed in an improvised manner. This is well documented in the negotiations for the treaty.
15. See extent of improvised devices from the operational statistics of one mine action operator, MAG: Figures 3 and 4.
16. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 10.
Quality Management and Standards for Humanitarian Improvised Explosive Device (HIED) Response Activities by Keeley [ from page 9 ]
1. See the UNMAS mine action portal at http://www.mineaction.org/issues.
2. Assuming victim assistance is mainstreamed into health and disability sectors and supported by specialist organizations that may not be involved in the ‘field’ elements of mine action.
3. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0418.
4. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0419.
5. Based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10 2nd Edition Amdt 3, Para 3.168.
6. See the explanation of response time analysis in “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”, Griffin and Keeley,
2004.
7. “Indemnify.” The Free Dictionary. Accessed 13 September 2017. http://bit.ly/2h1en9C.
Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM by Isikozlu, Krötz, and Trancart [ from page 14 ]
1. Loughran, Chris. “Developing good practice for measuring the success, effectiveness and impact of PSSM”, Manchester: MAG, May 2016. Accessed 4 August 2017.
http://bit.ly/2weqsLy.
2. Other agreements that are in force in the region include the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great
Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (2004) and most recently, the Kinshasa Convention (2017).
3. “ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.” Article 24(1). Accessed 4 August 2017. http://bit.
ly/1wPPgSM.
4. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk and Michael Ashkenazi. “Practices and approaches towards arms and ammunition management in Mali.” Unpublished report. Bonn:
BICC, 2015.
5. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk. “’Guns are for the Government’: An evaluation of a BICC advisory project on state-owned arms control in South Sudan.” BICC Working
paper. Bonn: BICC, 2014.
Promoting Secure Stockpiles and Countering Diversion by Berman and King [ from page 18 ]
1. Any list of partners supporting Small Arms Survey projects would include the Danish Demining Group, The HALO Trust, Handicap International, Mines Advisory
Group, and the United Nations Mines Action Service. Additional partners appear elsewhere in this short article. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.
2. MSAG is an apolitical, informal, and multinational platform of a dozen or so like-minded governments that, to the extent possible, since 2005 have worked together
to support each other’s efforts to improve stockpile management practices across the globe. See www.msag.es.
3. Berman, Eric G., and Pilar Reina. “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Concerns and Consequences.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action. 16.2 (2012): 4–9.
4. The PSSM Best Practice Cards are available in Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS—in the Latin alphabet), French, Portuguese,
Russian, Spanish, and Swahili.
5. For example, over the past three years, the Survey has added eight incidents and deleted five during the period 1979–2013.
6. See http://bit.ly/2llTGH8.
7. The UEMS Database records 19 events as having occurred in the United States, which have resulted in four dead and two injured. By way of comparison, while casualty data for many incidents is incomplete (including for those in the United States), the average number of casualties recorded for the other 548 UEMS in the 100
other countries in the database comes to more than 50.
8. The RASR Initiative Steering Committee comprises the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and the Small Arms Survey. The nine participating states since 2009, when the Initiative was launched, include Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. WRA provided funding from 2009 through 2015. The European
Union is funding RASR for the 2017–2019 period. Moldova has been invited to contribute to the Initiative. For more information. See www.rasrinitaitive.org.
9. Gobinet, Pierre, and Jovana Carapic. “Less Bang for the Buck: Stockpile Management in South-east Europe.” Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World (2015):
125–155.
10. Parker, Sarah. Facilitating PSSM Assistance in the Sahel and Beyond: Introducing the PSSM Priorities Matrix. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2016.
11. Berman, Eric G., Mihaela Racovita and Matt Schroeder. Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations. Geneva: Small Arms
Survey, 2017.
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